Under the banner of Syria’s new diplomacy approach, Ahmad Al-Sharaa is seeking talks with Russia, a former adversary responsible for many of the civilian casualties in during the war. If Syrians accepted normalization with Russia, could they also accept normalization with Israel?
On October 2025 and later, in January 2026, Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa made a somewhat surprising visit to Moscow. While the visit was presented positively and mostly with a ceremonial tone, it was not divorced of controversy. Russia’s aggression against the Syrian people and its alliance with the former Syrian president – who was warmly received in Moscow where he is now building his new life – does not make Putin a natural ally.
Russia has been a loyal ally of Syria’s former president and Russian forces took a major part in supporting Assad against the people of Syria including those affiliated by Al-Saraa. The Airwars project, a watchdog that tracks civilian casualties in conflict zones, civilian estimated that as many as 23,936 civilians were allegedly killed in Russian operations, with over 4,800 children among them between 2015 and 2021. The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) found that Russia is directly responsible for 6,969 civilians including 2,055 children and 983 women. They also recorded 1,251 attacks on vital civilian facilities (schools, hospitals, and markets) in Syria since the beginning of the Russian Federation’s military intervention on September 30, 2015.
However, as stated by Asaad Al-Shabaani, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria: “The diplomacy of the new Syria is focused on establishing good international relations for the benefit of the Syrian people” and peace is to be done with enemies. This approach of normalizing relations with governments that historically maintained hostile or manipulative relations with Syria brings forward one of the most complex questions for the new Syrian state the possibility of normalization with Israel.
Russia, Israel, and Syria have long been connected throughout the Syrian conflict
Since the fall of the Assad regime, Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed openness to good relations with Syria on the very first day after Assad’s fall. President al-Sharaa followed suit and, for a while, the prospects for a different relationship between the two countries appeared more positive. After all, Israel had its own contribution for the success of Sharaa’s campaign by weakening Iran and its proxies and hence clearing the path for HTS to Damascus.
Yet tensions quickly escalated between Syria and Israel due to security concerns especially toward groups previously labeled as terrorist organizations, and because of Israel’s continued military operations and occupation in the south of the country. So far, public opinion toward Israel remains largely negative just as it does toward Russia. However, by numbers, Russia’s actions in Syria caused far greater damage than Israel’s. This raises the key question: If Syrians accepted normalization with Russia, could they also accept normalization with Israel?
Russia, Israel, and Syria have long been connected throughout the Syrian conflict. Israel’s role in the Syrian war has evolved since its beginning. Initially, Israel attempted to stay out of the conflict. However, when the Syria war reached its border, it became more involved in supporting some of the rebel groups by creating a cross boarder humanitarian military operation called “Good Neighbors.” Starting in 2013, Israel provided limited support to over a dozen groups with the primary objective to prevent Iranian influence and secure the Israeli border.
This support was accompanied by Israeli airstrikes deeper inside Syria targeting Iranian bases. Although this policy continued for several years, support to rebel factions stopped in July 2018, as pro-Assad forces backed by Russia and Iran regained control over the Syrian South.
When the Israeli support to rebel groups ended, it was replaced by a new regional arrangement involving Moscow
In July 2018, Israeli officials reportedly reached an understanding with Russia that allowed regime forces to return to western Daraa and Quneitra, areas near the Golan Heights. In exchange, Russia committed to keeping Iran-backed militias at least 80 kilometers away from the Israeli border to obstruct Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets throughout Syria. In one sense, when the Israeli support to rebel groups ended, it was replaced by a new regional arrangement involving Moscow.
Although the Gaza peace deal, led by the United States and supported by several Arab and Western countries, aimed to calm tensions, Russia also expressed support for it. Putin publicly backed Trump’s Gaza peace plan and declared support for “peaceful efforts,” which reflected Moscow’s indirect involvement in broader Middle East peace initiatives.
By numbers, Russia’s aggression in Syria resulted in far greater damage and loss of life than Israel’s limited operations. The majority of Russian strikes deliberately targeted civilian areas, hospitals, schools, and markets while Israel’s attacks were mostly directed at Syrian and Iranian military bases, though civilian casualties also occurred.
Still, a key question arises: why might Syrians accept normalization with Russia but not with Israel? While most Syrians especially those who opposed the Assad regime reject both powers, their reactions toward each differ significantly.
Israel’s increased military escalation in Syria reignited tension and resentment among Syrians
Many Syrians remain deeply opposed to the Eastern bloc or the so-called Axis of Resistance due to what they suffered from Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war. Yet, a certain degree of positive sentiment toward Israel has emerged among parts of Syrian society in specific contexts. When Prime Minister Netanyahu eliminated Hassan Nasrallah, some Syrians even held celebration marches, saluting Netanyahu and Israel as a symbolic rejection of Iran-aligned forces rather than an act of genuine support for Israel itself.
However, after the fall of the Assad regime, Israel’s increased military escalation in Syria reignited tension and resentment among Syrians. The ongoing war in Gaza, particularly following the October 7 attacks, has further intensified public anger and strengthened solidarity with Palestinians making pragmatic normalization with Israel even more difficult for the time being.
Yet the question persists: could normalization with Israel eventually become easier after normalization with Russia both justified under Syria’s new diplomatic narrative?
As Syria further attempts to solidify inside and create a more open environment outside, it considers whether old enemies may turn to possible allies. In the case of Russia, it has been tested that even if the people oppose a certain enemy, it does not mean the state will too. The people’s enmity might be different from the state’s, and public attitudes would not necessarily halt a state’s decisions since they could also be influenced and changed. Can the precedent of Russia infer potential future scenarios when it comes to Israel? Time will tell as a list of Syrian demands, and a security agreement are already on the table. But the new Syria has begun to prove that, under the right circumstances, old enemies might become friends.
Dr. Nir Boms is a Research Fellow at the Forum for Regional Cooperation, Tel Aviv University. Francois Zankih is a human rights defender from Idlib and the founder of the Syrian Think Tank Tukhum. Published in Zenith