Boms, N. (2026). From Westphalia to Gaza: The Return of State Order. Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2025.2607778
Introduction
In the aftermath of yet another bloody war in the Middle East, President Donald Trump’s much-heralded 20-point plan may lead us toward at least a semblance of stability in the region. Although the successful implementation of the Gaza plan itself appears questionable, its broader conceptual framework merits consideration. At its core lies the restoration of effective statehood and the removal from power of actors committed to perpetual conflict. These remain necessary preconditions for any durable peace in the Middle East and real stability.
While to many, the proposal appears to be simply another ill-fated attempt to impose a temporary pause in the seemingly intractable Israeli–Palestinian conflict, a closer look suggests a broader strategic rationale. Specifically, it points to an implicit reliance on the time-honored Westphalian principles, emphasizing stability through the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity. From this perspective, the plan is not confined to Gaza but may actually be understood as part of a wider regional framework aimed at promoting stability across the Middle East by a broader attempt to bring back the old “State Order.”
States and the Nature of Man
Humans have been fighting one another since time immemorial. Early on, the Bible teaches us about the murder of Abel by his brother Cain and humanity’s prideful rebellion against God by building the Tower of Babel. According to Scripture, that was a watershed moment that led to the scattering of mankind across the globe—and the development of tribes, empires, and kingdoms that sought to extend their reach by conquering the land of their neighbors. Unfortunately, throughout history, there has never been a real change in that conduct. The idea that “only the dead have seen the end of war” (often mistakenly attributed to Plato) has never been invalidated.
Over the ages, some individuals also strove to achieve peace—whether for the sake of the idea itself or out of fatigue and the burdens of war. Following the carnage of the Thirty Years War, which by 1648 had left between 4 and 8 million dead, the Peace of Westphalia was signed. That agreement is often hailed as having brought calm to a continent that had been wracked by bloodshed. It did so because its authors recognized that peace and stability could only be ensured through the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The “Westphalian system” later gave rise to the concept of state sovereignty and the notion of power as a key element in ensuring a safer world.
Of course, the world looked very different in 1648, a time of empires and kings—not one of terrorist groups and proxy wars, hybrid governance and fragmented identities. Therefore, applying the Westphalian idea to places with very different political cultures—such as Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, or Yemen—has its limitations.
We cannot, of course, lionize the idea of statehood, assuming that stronger states are inherently stabilizing while weaker non-state actors are inherently bad. In today’s world, we cannot ignore the political functions of hybrid governments and militias that lead many of the active conflicts in the world today. Nevertheless, the Westphalian analogy might still offer valuable lessons for the future.
The Modern State Order
In his seminal Why Men Fight (1917), British philosopher Bertrand Russell noted that war arises out of ordinary human nature and that it became a “permanent institution of all free communities.” Men fight because of patriotism, imperialism, and the pursuit of power, but also because of what he called “the fear of thought.” Russell penned that tract having observed the empires fighting in the Great War. He believed that the establishment of a world federation was necessary to prevent war. Though skeptical of its suggested structure, he endorsed the League of Nations as a sincere effort that could eventually accomplish that goal. Russell’s reservations were not unfounded, and the League failed to restore stability in a world that went to war barely two decades after it had laid down its arms in the last one.
World War II was the bloodiest war in history, leaving over 60 million dead, including the six million Jews murdered in the Holocaust. When the guns went silent, another attempt was made to recalibrate the world order and again it harkened back to Westphalia. In 1945, fewer than 100 independent states existed, but nearly as many more would emerge in the following decades. Many arose from the ashes of collapsing empires and the decolonization process, which reshaped the political topography of Asia and Africa. At the same time, the Soviet Union consolidated control over Central and Eastern Europe. Germany was divided into four occupation zones (with additional parts ceded to Poland and the Soviet Union) and later reorganized into the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. India and the newly created Pakistan, the Philippines, and other countries such as Myanmar and Indonesia gained independence. These developments conferred recognition and legitimacy on emerging national movements, a pattern reflected in Palestine, where the 1947 UN Resolution 181 called for the creation of both a Jewish and an Arab state.
Held together by a stronger Security Council, the Westphalian model has had a slightly better track record than it did in previous years. A long cold war of deterrence provided a better alternative to another global conflict, and while wars certainly did not disappear, at least they were not of the same magnitude. The Middle East experienced a period of relative stability sustained by entrenched authoritarian regimes and reinforced by Cold War geopolitical dynamics. Although internal coups persisted and the struggle over Palestine continued, regional borders largely remained intact. Following the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, it appeared that the era of interstate warfare in the region was becoming passé.
But human beings will always find ways to fight wars. While states began to come to terms with the idea of keeping soldiers in their barracks, they also began to realize that this alone would not be enough to prevent violence. The horrific terror attack of 9/11 provided a grim reminder that the structure of power had changed and that states do not have a monopoly on military power.
Of course, terrorism was nothing new, but the emerging non-state actors, including terrorist organizations and proxy militias, increasingly came to dominate patterns of violence in the Middle East, exposing the fragility of what had appeared to be a residual Westphalian order. The so-called Arab Spring—a wave of unrest that began in Tunisia in 2011 and spread to Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Kuwait, and Libya—profoundly destabilized the region, toppling several regimes and producing levels of violence that, in many cases, exceeded those of earlier interstate wars. In Syria, for example, at the peak of the uprising-turned civil, ethnic, and proxy war, the number was estimated at 20,000 casualties monthly. This erosion of the regional order became particularly evident in 2014, when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) proclaimed the establishment of a caliphate via an online audio statement. The group’s subsequent campaign of ruthless violence underscored the collapse of effective sovereignty, and it took several years of coordinated international efforts to dismantle the caliphate.
The Westphalian Vacuum
For over fifteen years, it seems that there was little evidence of the Westphalian order in the region. Syria endured a complex civil and proxy war involving over 1,000 militias, resulting in the displacement of two-thirds of its population and causing nearly a million deaths. In Lebanon, state authority has long been overshadowed by Hezbollah, which has grown stronger than the national army and effectively conducts its own foreign policy. Yemen’s civil war has left the country fragmented, while ongoing protests and political instability in Iraq have increased its susceptibility to Iran’s pernicious influence.
While states have played a role in this new dynamic—primarily by creating, supporting, and funding proxy groups—the conflicts themselves continue to revolve around identity, ethnicity, ideology, and religion. As in earlier wars, actors often frame violence through a conception of the divine. While conventional militaries may rarely confront one another directly, global violence has surged to levels unseen since the post-World War II period. According to PRIO’s Conflict Trends report, 2024 saw a record sixty-one armed conflicts across thirty-six countries, the highest number in over seventy years.
This is where the 20-point plan for Gaza comes in. Since October 7, the Gaza war has expanded to fronts in the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran, emerging as a major source of friction and instability in the Middle East. The spread of kinetic warfare across the region is one obvious driver, but no less important are the images of war that further enflamed tensions, shaping public opinion away from the agenda of engagement and cooperation. To be sure, Hamas efforts to rally support around the Palestinian cause—while undermining the normalization agenda—have seen some success. According to the latest Arab Barometer survey of sixteen Middle Eastern countries, support for normalization with Israel has sharply declined, alongside reduced backing for its Western allies.
The objective of the Gaza plan is to alter this trajectory—not only in Gaza but across the broader region. The premise is that resolving the situation in Gaza could advance a wider effort to “make the Middle East great again.” Achieving this requires weakening the key agents of destabilization—and defusing the Palestinian issue more broadly. The plight of the Palestinians cannot improve under Hamas rule. Lebanon’s course will remain constrained as long as Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy, is stronger than the Lebanese army. In Syria, a power-sharing arrangement and the safeguarding of minority rights is necessary to ensure the creation and preservation of a cohesive state. Since Iran is at the core of the destabilizing axis, a way must be found to further weaken its influence in Yemen, Iraq, and elsewhere in the region. To counter Iran, the Gaza plan is structured around a regional coalition of stabilizing states that attempt to share this agenda.
The ideas born out of Westphalia—strengthening stability by sovereignty and territorial integrity—are reemerging in the Middle East. The restoration of regional strength requires political stability and the support of the relevant stakeholders. Far from displaying naïveté or detachment from the region’s fraught history, the American-led initiative offers sound reasoning in focusing on the effort to remove destabilizing actors, including militias and proxy forces. Only by reinforcing state authority can the Middle East chart a more secure path forward; in short, the goal is to make the states states again.
The Westphalian Devil
While the concept laid out here is clear, the devil is always in the details. Proxy powers and militias will not voluntarily pick up and go, which means that patience, persistence, and kinetics might be needed to complete the job. Moreover, it is important that the effort be led by the powers that are genuinely interested in, and stand to benefit from, stability. Therefore, touting Qatar and Turkey as the guardians of Gaza and the patrons of the new regional order has the potential to create an alternative axis of power that will not conform to that vison. Both countries, which offered material and operational support for Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (a group that was recently banned in the United States, as it has been in the majority of countries in the region), will find it difficult to join an effort aimed at weakening those whom they themselves support and endorse.
The Gaza plan presents many other challenges, starting with finding the partners to form the International Stabilization Force. Few appear willing to step up to the plate, especially as it seems that the war is not over and that force will again be needed to disarm Hamas. We have not even touched upon the question of who will underwrite the cost of the plan and coordinate the reconstruction efforts. We must also ask who will be in a position to take charge of the envisioned Palestinian entity.
Nevertheless, and irrespective of the prospects of success, the vision still matters and should still inspire. The Middle East, an artificial creation of receding colonial powers, could recover at least a measure of stability. However, to achieve that, the region will need stronger states—and weaker non-state actors. As improbable as it may sound, the struggle for the new Westphalian order might actually begin in Gaza. With the sustained implementation of a well-thought-out plan and real persistence, states might become states again and the region itself might finally enjoy the fruits of a Westphalian peace.