In this latest edition of Tel Aviv Notes, Nir Boms and Karim Nassar examine the Suwayda crisis in Syria and how it has affected the delicate balance of relations between the new government in Syria and its Druze minority.
Bedouin families leaving the city of Suwayda, July 2025. Credit: Syrian Ministry of Interior, via Wikimedia commons
In July 2025, violence erupted in Suwayda, a southern Syrian city and stronghold of the Druze minority in Syria. Disturbing images of death, mutilation, and militia clashes shocked Israel and much of the world. To grasp the crisis, one must understand the interplay of local rivalries, national politics, and the struggle for regional power shaping southern Syria today.
Recent Israeli strikes in Syria have been analyzed by some as humanitarian interventions to protect the Druze community, and others as escalatory breaches of Syrian sovereignty that risks further destabilizing the country. This policy wall tackles the nature of Israeli-Syrian relations post-Assad, the prospects of some form of agreement between the two sides, and the potential input of the Abraham Accords countries such as the UAE in mediating this interplay. Speaker: Nir Boms, Research Fellow, Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, Israel Moderator: Mahdi Ghuloom, Junior Fellow in Geopolitics, ORF Middle East.
Israel’s approach to Syria since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has become more assertive, driven by security fears that were intensified by the trauma of the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks. For Jerusalem, the emergence of the interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s transitional government is a double-edged sword that could serve as an opportunity for strategic realignment, but also poses latent threats.
Although al-Sharaa’s rise has rightfully generated considerable concern given his jihadist background, the new Syrian government’s first six months has had notable positive developments. This includes the presentation of a pragmatic agenda that has emphasized power-sharing, minority rights, and economic development.
Further bolstering his international standing, al-Sharaa secured broad sanctions relief from the United States after a meeting with President Donald Trump in Saudi Arabia.
The US president’s recent executive order lifting Syria sanctions, signed on June 30, states that “the United States is committed to supporting a Syria that is stable, unified, and at peace with itself and its neighbors.” al-Sharaa also assuaged fears about potential nuclear activity after he offered full cooperation and access to the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency after a visit by the agency’s Director General Rafael Grossi in early June.
Although al-Sharaa has made several moves that should reassure Israeli decision makers: refraining from engaging with Hamas, expelling factions of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Hamas, arresting two senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad figures, and trying to thwart smuggling operations between Iran and Hezbollah across Syria—they appear unconvinced.
What does Syria look like five months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad — both on the Syrian side and on the Israeli side of the border — and what are the risks and opportunities facing decision-makers in Jerusalem?
On December 8, 2024, Syria experienced a historic turning point with the fall of Bashar al-Assad. This dramatic development has ushered in a new phase of uncertainty and transition, offering both risks and opportunities. While it is still too early to determine Syria’s long-term trajectory, the new leadership under President Ahmed al-Sharaa has made cautious moves to stabilize the country. However, Israel’s initial reaction—shaped by security anxieties and the trauma of the October 7 attack—has resulted in a militarized and unilateral approach that risks overlooking emerging diplomatic openings and reinforcing old patterns of confrontation. This article examines the unfolding dynamics in Syria, the risks of an overly reactive Israeli policy, and the strategic opportunities that could emerge if Israel shifts from a posture of fear to one of cautious engagement. A recalibrated approach might not only improve Israeli security but also reshape the broader regional landscape.
